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NOTES
which involves a risk of injury to the user is liable to any
person, who without fault on his part, sustains an injury
caused by a defect in the design or manufacture of the article,
if the injury might have been reasonably anticipated."
Nevertheless, except in cases of fabricator-vendors of food-
stuffs, there is no clear picture in Louisiana as to when the
vendor will be held liable for damages caused by a defective
product.
Conclusion
It is submitted that the courts or the legislature should adopt
a workable rule that will guide vendors in protecting them-
selves. A start in that direction would be to hold any vendor
liable who represents himself as the manufacturer of a product
which, if defective, involves an unreasonable risk of harm
when used for the foreseeable purpose for which it was intended
by a consumer. This rule should apply whether or not the vendor
had a part in the manufacturing process. Penn can be inter-
preted to establish this rule. Yet, a more explicit and definitive
holding on which to base the standard would be desirable.
John M. Madison, Jr.
THE EFFECT OF A DECLARATION OF HoMEsTEAD ON A
PRE-EXISTING ORDINARY DET
Article XI of the Louisiana Constitution exempts from sale
and seizure "the homestead, bona fide, owned by the debtor and
occupied by him" consisting of lands and other property to the
total value of not more than $4,000.00.1 It also provides that the
exemption exists, without registration, except in cities having
a population of more than 250,000.2
1. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1, as amended, La. Acts 1932, No. 142, adopted
Nov. 8, 1932; La. Acts 1938, No. 42, adopted Nov. 8, 1938, provides in part:
"There shall -be exempt from seizure and sale by any process whatever,
except as hereinafter provided, the homestead, bona fide, owned by the
debtor and occupied by him, consisting of lands, not exceeding one hundred
and sixty (160) acres . . . whether rural or urban, of every head of family,
or person having . . . a person or persons dependent on him . . . for sup-
port; . . . to the total value of not more than Four Thousand Dollars
($4,000.00)."
2. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 4, as amended, La. Acts 1938, No. 42, adopted Nov.
8, 1938; La. Acts 1952, No. 101, adopted Nov. 4, 1952, provides: "The home-
stead exemptions herein provided shall exist without registration except
1968]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
Two situations are contemplated by these sections--one in
which recording a homestead declaration is unnecessary, and
the other in which it is necessary. In considering whether a
homestead exemption is superior or inferior to a pre-existing
ordinary debt, each of these will be discussed.
In either situation, before a debtor can claim the exemption,
he must meet four requirements. As stated in Engstrom's of
Alexandria, Inc. v. Vaughn,"
"(1) He must be a bona-fide owner of the land;
(2) He must occupy the premises as a resident;
(3) He must have a family or person or persons dependent
on him for support;
(4) And the property must not exceed in value $4,000
"4
The Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with the situation in
which no recordation of the exemption is required in Pouncy
v. Gunby's Estate.5 There a debt was contracted at a time when
the debtor was not entitled to the homestead exemption. He
defaulted, and the creditor sued. But before the claim could be
reduced to judgment, the debtor married and settled on the
land as a homestead. The Supreme Court, in affirming judgment
for the debtor, said:
"It is clear that the existence of an ordinary debt, even
though it be reduced to judgment, will not, unless the judg-
ment be recorded, operate to prevent the acquisition of a
right of homestead which will protect property, occupied
and claimed as a homestead, from seizure in satisfaction of
such judgments."6
where the property is situated in a city having a population of more than
two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) in which latter event, said exemp-
tions shall not be valid unless recorded in the manner provided by Act
114 of 1880 (now La. R.S. 20:1) or as may be otherwise provided by law."
3. 138 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
4. Id. at 677. See also Brantley v. Pruitt, 175 La. 879, 144 So. 604 (1932);
Denis v. Gayle, 40 La. Ann. 286, 4 So. 3 (1888); Anderson v. Finley, 84
So.2d 845 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
5. 138 La. 10, 69 So. 856 (1915).
6. Id. at 11, 69 So. at 856; La. Const. art. 244 (1913); Robert v. Coco,
25 La. Ann. 199 (1873); Doughty v. Sheriff, 27 La. Ann. 355 (1875). La. Const.
art. 244 (1913) provided in part: "There shall be exempt from seizure and
sale by any process whatever, except as herein provided, and without reg-
istration, the homestead, owned by the debtor and occupied by him, con-
sisting of lands, not exceeding one hundred and sixty acres ... to the value
of two thousand dollars." (Emphasis added.)
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In contrast, the situation requiring recordation of the decla-
ration remains unsettled as the precise issue has never been
decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court with reference to the
present constitutional provisions. The most recent judicial ex-
pression on this question was by the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Holahan v. Nugent.7 The issue as stated by
the court was
"whether ordinary debts of creditors with no lien, pledge,
or title, which are incurred during the period of occupancy
of a family home in a Louisiana city of more than 100,000
[presently 250,000] population and before the filing of the
declaration of homestead exemption, are enforceable against,
or from the proceeds of, property subsequently claimed and
perfected as a homestead by the recording of a homestead
exemption. '8
The court affirmed the district judge's decision "that the home-
stead exemption was superior to, and should be prior to the
payment of the claims of the unsecured creditors." 9 However,
the dissent noted that where recordation is required, the home-
stead is exempt only as to debts contracted after the recorda-
tion of the declaration.
The view that the homestead exemption, once recorded, is
superior only to subsequent debts is strongly supported by Suc-
cession of Furniss.10 There it was held that under the Consti-
tution of 1879 the exemptions only take effect from the date of
registry, as provided by law, and are inoperative against debts
contracted prior to such registry. This decision seems clearly
to indicate that an exemption recorded as required is inferior
to pre-existing ordinary debts, even when not reduced to lien
status, such as by recorded judgment. However, there is an
important distinction between the homestead provisions in the
Constitution of 1879 and that of the present Constitution. The
Constitution of 1879 expressly prohibited the waiver of the
exemption." Therefore, the court felt it necessary for the pro-
tection of the debtor and his securing of credit to hold as it did,
allowing him to utilize his entire property as a credit basis by
7. 198 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1952).
8. Id. at 654.
9. Id.
10. 34 La. Ann. 1013 (1882).
11. La. Const art. 222 (1879) provided in part: "The homestead shall
not be susceptible of mortgage . . . nor shall any renunciation or waiver of
homestead rights . . . be valid." (Emphasis added.)
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abstaining from registry.12 However, the present constitution
recognizes a right to waive the exemption,18 thus eliminating
any need to follow Furniss today.
Other cases allowing recovery on a pre-existing debt can
be distinguished on the ground that they had the additional
element of a mortgage which had been executed on the property
prior to the declaration. The policy of the courts favoring mort-
gages was established in Clark v. Natal' 4 and followed in Wil-
liams v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.,15 in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared:
"The jurisprudence is constant and uniform that privileges,
mortgages, and real rights attached to the property cannot
be disturbed or affected by homesteads which do not exist
at the moment they attach."'6
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Guillory1 also held that home-
stead rights could not prejudice a mortgage claim which at-
tached to property before it became a homestead.
The case which lends strongest support to the conclusion
that the homestead exemption, once established, is superior to
pre-existing debts not reduced to recorded judgments is Pouncy
v. Gunby's Estate,'s discussed previously. Although the case
dealt with a situation in which recordation was unnecessary, it
would seem that the same policy considerations would dictate
its application in those situations in which registry is required.
12. In Succession of Furniss, 34 La. Ann. 1013, 1014 (1882), the court
said: "The object of the convention was transparent and, it seems to us,
a very wise one. It saw that the effect of the homestead provisions, coupled,
as it was, with the prohibition of the conventional waiver thereof, would
be to cripple the credit and resources of the beneficiaries, which, under
many circumstances would be more injurious than beneficial to them. It,
therefore, gave them the option of availing themselves or not of the privi-
lege, as their interests might require. It said to them: if you desire to
secure your homestead from the risks and chances of business, you may
do so by registering your exemption as required by law. If, on the con-
trary, you desire to retain your whole property in a situation to serve as
a basis of credit, for the purpose of conducting your business Qperations,
we leave you the option of doing so, by simply abstaining from registry."
13. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 3, provides in part: "Any person entitled to
a homestead may waive same, in whole or in part, by signing a written
waiver thereof ...." (Emphasis added.)
14. 138 La. 1038, 71 So. 149 (1916).
15. 173 La. 354, 137 So. 59 (1931).
16. Id. at 355, 137 So. at 60. The court then cited Coltharp v. West,
127 La. 430, 53 So. 675 (1910); Ellis v. Freyhan, 124 La. 53, 49 So. 975 (1909);
Taylor v. Saloy, 38 La. Ann. 62 (1886).
17. 175 La. 1058, 145 So. 6 (1932).
18. 138 La. 10, 69 So. 856 (1915).
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In Cloud v. Cloud,"9 the court set forth these policy considera-
tions:
"The homestead exemption is a law of public policy of this
state, the object of which 'is to secure a home beyond the
reach of financial misfortune, around which gathers the
affection of the family, the greatest incentive to virtue, to
honor, and to industry' (59 So. 2d 881, cited below), on the
theory that the protection of the family is of at least para-
mount importance to the state as the payment of debts."2
Additionally, in Poole v. Cook,2 an 1882 case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that although the homestead provision of
1865 applied only to rural property 2 2 the one in the Constitu-
tion of 1879 applied to both rural and urban property,23 and
the same is true of the present Constitution. 24
It is submitted that the Pouncy rule should apply in all
homestead exemption cases. There is no valid reason for dis-
criminating between the two situations by holding that where
recording is not required the established homestead is superior
to prior ordinary debts not reduced to recorded judgments, but
where recording is required it is superior only as to subsequent
debts. To do so would only result in an unjust discrimination
against the urban property owner.
Ronald W. Tweedel
LABOR LAW-PRODUCT BOYCOTT CLAUSES AND SECTION 8(e)
Secton 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act' provides
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
and an employer to enter into an agreement under which the
employer agrees to refrain from using the products of another
employer. Whether product boycott clauses aimed at "work
19. 127 So.2d 560 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 565; cf. Lafayette Bldg. Ass'n v. Spofford, 221 La. 549, 59
So.2d 880 (1952); Hammond State Bank & Trust Co. v. Broderick, 179 La.
693, 154 So. 739 (1934); Garner v. Freeman, 118 La. 184, 42 So. 767 (1907);
Hebert v. Mayer, 48 La. Ann. 938, 20 So. 170 (1896).
21. 34 La. Ann. 333 (1882).
22. La. Acts 1865, No. 33, § 1.
23. La. Const. art. 219 (1879).
24. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
1. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
136 (1947), and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-
Griffin Act), 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1964). N. L. R. A.
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